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BOOK REVIEWS

Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 242 pages. $99 cloth, $35 paper.
C. STEPHEN EVANS, Baylor University
A major new work from Richard Swinburne is always worth paying close
attention to. In Mind, Brain, and Free Will Swinburne revisits some issues
he treated earlier in The Evolution of the Soul. However, the new book is
genuinely new. Although Swinburne still defends a form of substance
dualism as the right account of the mind-body problem, the new work
presents arguments for this position that are much more developed and
refined, and he successfully links problems in the philosophy of mind
with problems in the philosophy of action dealing with human freedom
and moral responsibility.
Swinburne begins, as he often likes to do, by laying out his views on basic
underlying issues in ontology and epistemology. Ontologically, he claims
that to tell the “history of the world” requires only substances, properties, and events, with “events” being used to refer not only to changes but
also to state of affairs that do not involve change. The history of the world
can be told in many different ways, since there is more than one correct
way to cut the world up into events. However, assuming some consistent
procedure for deciding what counts as an event, all that is needed to give
a complete history of the world would be to give a subset of the events
whose occurrence “entails the occurrence of all the events” (9).
In chapter 2 Swinburne gives a succinct account of the epistemological
position he relies on, which is a form of internalism on which the strength
of a belief ought to be proportioned to the evidence one has. To avoid
skepticism, Swinburne argues we must accept a “principle of credulity,”
which allows us to have justified “basic beliefs.” According to this view,
“what seems to us to be so probably is so” (42), unless we have some
other evidence that calls this into question. He provides a helpful list of
the sources of justification, both direct and indirect, and applies all this to
our beliefs about logical modalities.
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Swinburne’s account of when properties are identical or distinct depends crucially on the notion of an “informative designator,” which is a
rigid designator, for which it is also true that “anyone who knows what the
word means (that is, has the linguistic knowledge of how to use it) knows
a certain set of conditions necessary and sufficient (in any possible world)
for a thing to be that thing (whether or not he can state those conditions
in words)” (12). Swinburne holds that two properties are not identical if
and only if their informative designators are not logically equivalent. A
mental property is defined as “one to whose instantiation in it a substance
necessarily has privileged access on all occasions of its instantiation” (67).
Swinburne claims that it is clear from this that mental properties are not
identical to physical properties, because “the criteria for being in pain are
not the same as the criteria for having some brain property (e.g., ‘having one’s c-fibres fire’), or behaving in a certain way in response to bodily
stimulus (e.g., crying out when a needle is stuck into you). The criteria for
being in pain are how the subject feels, and the criteria for brain and behavioural events are what any one could perceive” (69–70). There are thus
mental properties (and mental events in Swinburne’s sense of “event”)
that are not identical to physical properties and events. Swinburne argues
that David Papineau’s view that what we call physical and mental properties simply represent two distinct ways of apprehending the same reality
in the end requires us to admit two distinct types of properties which enable us to make the distinction (98).
In chapter 4 Swinburne argues carefully against the idea that physical
events are “causally closed” by arguing that we must believe that intentions (which must be mental events) cause actions. This chapter gives a
clear and careful rebuttal of various philosophical arguments for the
causal closure of the physical (CCP), and includes a detailed look at recent
neuroscience and physical theory, arguing that nothing from these fields
makes dualistic interaction impossible or even improbable. The chapter
concludes with an argument that no conceivable scientific findings could
establish the causal closure of the physical, because such scientific findings must rely on apparent memory, but “virtually all apparent memories
could only be believed on the assumption that (CCP) was false” (119). (I
assume that Swinburne here means “rationally believed.”)
Chapters 5 and 6 move from property/event dualism to substance dualism by arguing that, strictly speaking, it is persons who form intentions
which bring out the brain events that lead to actions. Here Swinburne
defends an account of the fundamental laws of nature (and therefore
also of causation) which understands the regularities as “regularities in
the causal powers and liabilities of substances” (129). Such an account is
argued to be superior both to Hume-inspired views as well as accounts
which see laws of nature as regularities between universals. Intentional
causation cannot be understood at all in terms of a regularity between
types of events, and Swinburne’s account of causation allows us to see
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agent causation and what is often called event causation as two species of
the same (somewhat mysterious) relation.
A mental substance is “one for which the possession of some mental
property is essential,” which means that for a mental substance to exist it
must have “some beliefs or desires or at least a disposition to have sensations or thoughts or form intentions” (141). A physical substance is simply one for which no mental property is essential, and a “pure mental
substance” is one whose existence is logically possible without its having
any physical properties. Human persons are first argued to be mental substances, because some mental properties (connected to the fact that human
persons “co-experience” diverse things as part of a unified consciousness)
are necessary to “delimit the physical boundaries of the substance” (143).
Obviously human persons are closely linked to their brains (and bodies
as a whole), but Swinburne argues that, however close the relationship,
humans are essentially pure mental substances, as Descartes thought. (Interestingly, Swinburne argues that Aquinas’s view is not significantly different from this, contrary to many Aquinas interpreters.) This part of the
argument relies on Swinburne’s claim that the “simple” view of personal
identity is correct. A number of thought experiments are used to argue
that neither physical continuity nor psychological continuity are necessary for personal identity (though both provide evidence for identity). A
person is a continuing mental substance, even if that substance cannot
(contingently) exist without a body. In these chapters, as in the rest of the
book, Swinburne pays close attention to recent neuroscience and argues
his view is completely consistent with scientific findings.
In the last two chapters, Swinburne argues first that humans have libertarian freedom, and then that such freedom is a necessary condition
for moral responsibility. Here he includes an account of how to deal with
Frankfurt-type counter-examples, and also a response to Fischer’s “semicompatibilism.” Although humans have free will, the scope of its exercise is limited. When humans have strong desires to do a certain act, and
no reason to do otherwise, including no moral reasons, it is inevitable
that they will try to perform the act. (Intentions are treated as “tryings.”)
Similarly, if a person thinks an act is morally good, and has no desire
to do otherwise, what the person will do is inevitable. However, there
are cases in which our desires and our moral beliefs about what is good
are at odds, and in some such cases our actions are freely determined by
us. Swinburne thinks, as did such philosophers as C. A. Campbell, that
our power to overcome our desires depends partly on the strength of the
desires, and partly on the strength of our wills. There are certainly cases
then where a person will be unable to act freely, either because the will
is too weak or the desires are too strong. One might think that this kind
of libertarian freedom is inconsistent with the view (which Swinburne
seems to take for granted) that our actions are proximately caused by our
brains. However, Swinburne argues that physical indeterminacy implies
that the laws governing the brain can only be probabilistic, and that the

108

Faith and Philosophy

probabilistic regularities discovered (or that are likely to be discovered)
are consistent with this kind of narrow exercise of free will.
This book is a notable achievement. It is true that in some ways
Swinburne’s arguments are traditional: recognizable descendants of
Descartes, appealing to thought experiments and also to phenomenological facts about consciousness. However, what is original is the care and
precision with which Swinburne develops the arguments, along with the
careful attention paid to contemporary philosophical arguments against
his views and contemporary neuroscience. Given the kind of dogmatic
allegiance many philosophers today have for scientific naturalism and
physicalism, Swinburne’s arguments are unlikely to create a major shift
towards substance dualism. However, the book deserves a serious hearing, both by religious and non-religious readers. (Swinburne nowhere
appeals to theism or any religious doctrines in making his case.)
In closing I shall mention a few things that the book does not do. It
would not be right to call these criticisms, since one book cannot do everything, but I think some attention to these areas would strengthen the
case for substance dualism. First, Swinburne does not say a lot about the
nature of a mental substance, but some will find this concept puzzling and
obscure. (Although, as Locke argued, probably no more obscure than the
notion of a physical substance.) Second, although Swinburne argues for
interactionism, he says little about how the interaction takes place. Presumably, there must be basic causal laws that connect mental and physical
substances, and perhaps since they are basic these laws cannot be further
analyzed or explained. However, since this is often alleged to be the chief
weakness of substance dualism, more could be said about it, and about
the general relation of the mind to the body. It is obvious that Swinburne
thinks that there is a close relation, but there is little discussion of how
interaction might occur. I myself think that dualistic philosophers should
think more than they have about the concept of embodiment or incarnation
(not understood as a theological term.) If, like Swinburne and Descartes,
we take the human person to be a pure mental substance, rather than a
composite of body and soul, could we nevertheless think of the body as
in some way the mode of existence the mind takes in this life, rather than
a separate “entity” or “part” of the person? This might allow us to agree
that the person is distinct from his or her body, but still see the person and
body as intimately fused.
Finally, Swinburne says very little about how his version of substance
dualism coheres with evolutionary theories of how human persons came
to exist in their present form. Perhaps to treat this subject adequately he
would have to turn to broader metaphysical issues, and think about the
relation between God’s creative activity and the evolutionary process.
Although I wish Swinburne had said more than he does about all these
issues, this book presents a powerful and elegant case for very traditional
views of the human person. Both those who are sympathetic to these
views and those who are critical are in Swinburne’s debt.

